Bounded Rationality for Data Reasoning based on Formal Concept Analysis by Aranda Corral, Gonzalo A. et al.
Bounded Rationality for Data Reasoning based on Formal Concept Analysis
Gonzalo A. Aranda-Corral
Department of Information Technology
Universidad de Huelva
Palos de La Frontera, Spain
Email:gonzalo.aranda@dti.uhu.es
Joaquı́n Borrego-Dı́az and Juan Galán-Páez




Abstract—Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is a theory whose
goal is to discover and extract Knowledge from qualitative
data. It also provides tools for sound reasoning (implication
basis and association rules). The aim of this paper is to apply
FCA to a new model for bounded rationality based on the
implicational reasoning over contextual knowledge bases which
are obtained from contextual selections. A contextual selection
is a selection of events and attributes about them which induces
partial contexts from a global formal context. In order to
avoid inconsistencies, association rules are selected as reasoning
engine. The model is applied to forecast sport results.
Keywords-Formal Concept Analysis, Bounded Rationality,
Confidence Reasoning
I. INTRODUCTION
Bounded Rationality (BR) is intimately related with the
human capacity for making inferences under limited time
and Knowledge [1]. From the viewpoint of Artificial In-
telligence (AI), BR comprises reasoning techniques that
facilitate, for example, context and temporal reasoning. Psy-
chological research on specific heuristics in human inference
processing reveals a complex framework where traditional
approaches to classical logic is not sound for explaining
the success of several of them, as for example Recognition
Heuristic (RH) [2]. A number of experiments show that
cognitive mechanisms capable of successful performance in
the real world do not need to satisfy the classical norms
of rational inference (cf. [3]; see also [4]). In fact, an
intriguing question from ecological rationality analysis is:
How could more knowledge be no better—or worse—than
significantly less knowledge? [2]. One of the key features
in BR is that inference process is concentrated on a limited
set of experiences in which objects, properties and actions
are selected. In this paper we aim to model this feature with
Formal Concept Analysis.
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) [5] is a mathematical
theory for data analysis, using formal contexts and concept
lattices as key tools. Domains can be formally modelled
according to the extent and the intent of each formal concept.
In FCA, the basic data structure is a formal context (with
a qualitative nature) which represents a set of objects and
their properties. It is useful both to detect and to describe
regularities and the relationship structures among concepts.
It also provides a sound formalism for reasoning with such
structures, mainly implication basis and association rules.
Roughly speaking, formal contexts represent weak struc-
tures easily built from experience that allow the extraction of
knowledge from them. Despite its simple data structure, for-
mal contexts are useful structures for knowledge extraction
(cf. [5]) and reasoning. Moreover, in BR it is well known that
in several cases simple statistical forecasting rules, which are
usually simplifications of models, have been shown to make
better predictions than more complex rules, especially when
the future values of a criterion are highly uncertain [6]. The
thesis of the paper is that association rules associated to
formal contexts can be an interesting source for BR.
The aim is to present a logical model of BR based on
reasoning on subcontexts of a predetermined (global) context
which plays the role of global memory/qualitative dataset.
The model is based on the existence of some selective
processes (named contextual selection here) which induce
specific contexts, and implicational basis are extracted from
them (namely Stem Basis [7] and association rules). The
reasoning with these Knowledge Bases (KB) (called con-
textual KB) is the model reasoning proposed in the paper.
Logical combination of contextual KBs in order to avoid
inconsistencies with background Knowledge can be made.
The model has been used in [8] to describe a confidence-
based (and contextual) reasoning system for forecasting
sports betting. In this paper we analyse the soundness of
the formal model as one of bounded rationality, presenting
the theoretical framework.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section
reviews the main elements of FCA and its logical features.
In section 3 the role of formal contexts as basic bricks for a
model of bounded rationality is presented. Section 4 reviews
an experiment by using the model for forecasting in sports
betting. Section 5 is devoted to describe future work.
II. BACKGROUND: FORMAL CONCEPT ANALYSIS
According to R. Wille, FCA [5] mathematizes the philo-
sophical understanding of a concept as a unit of thoughts
composed of two parts: the extent and the intent. The
extent covers all objects belonging to this concept, while the
intent comprises of all common attributes valid for all the
Figure 1. partial context from observation and Stem Basis
objects under consideration. It also allows the computation
of concept hierarchies from data tables. In this section, we
succinctly present basic FCA elements (see [5] for details).
A formal context M = (O,A, I) consists of two sets,
O (objects) and A (attributes) and a relation I ⊆ O × A.
Finite contexts can be represented by a 1-0-table (identifying
I with a Boolean function on O × A). See Fig. 1 for an
example of formal context about live beings.
The FCA main goal is the computation of the concept
lattice from the context. For X ⊆ O and Y ⊆ A we define
X ′ := {a ∈ A | oIa for all o ∈ X}
Y ′ := {o ∈ O | oIa for all a ∈ Y }
A (formal) concept is a pair (X,Y ) such that X ′ = Y and
Y ′ = X .
In this paper it works with logical relations on attributes
which are valid in the context and the standard implicational
logic in FCA (see, e.g., [5]), called implications between
attributes.
Definition. 1 An implication between attributes is a pair of
sets of attributes, written as Y1 → Y2,
An implication is true with respect to a formal context
M = (O,A, I) according to the following definition. A
subset T ⊆ A respects Y1 → Y2 if Y1 6⊆ T or Y2 ⊆ T .
It says that Y1 → Y2 holds in M (M |= Y1 → Y2) if for all
o ∈ O, the set {o}′ respects Y1 → Y2. In that case, it is said
that Y1 → Y2 is an implication of M .
Definition. 2 Let L be a set of implications and L be an
implication of M .
1) L follows from L (L |= L) if each subset of A
respecting L also respects L.
2) L is complete if every implication of the context
follows from L.
3) L is non-redundant if for each L ∈ L, L \ {L} 6|= L.
4) If L is a (implication) basis for M is complete and
non-redundant.
A well-known method for computing specific implica-
tional basis, called Stem Basis (SB), exists [7]. It is imple-
mented into Conexp (http://sourceforge.net/projects/conexp/)
software. A SB for live beings’ formal context is provided in
Fig. 1. It is important to remark that SB is only an example
of a basis for a formal context. In this paper any specific
property of the SB can be used, so it can be replaced by
any implication basis.
It is possible to extend |= in relation to any propositional
formula with propositional variables in A, by considering
each object o ∈M as a valuation vo on A defining
vo(A) = 1⇐⇒ (o,A) ∈ I
So M |= F if and only if vo |= F for any o ∈ O.






X ∪ Z → Y
R3 :
X → Y, Y ∪ Z →W
X ∪ Z →W
it holds that the implicational bases are `A-complete (a
straightforward consequence of Armstrong’s result [9]):
Theorem 3 Let L be a basis for a formal context M , and
L an implication. Then M |= L if and only if L `A L.
In order to work with formal contexts, stem basis and
association rules, the Conexp has been selected. It is used as
a library to build the module which provides the implications
(and association rules) to the reasoning module of our
system. The reasoning module is a production system based
on what was designed for [10]. Initially it works with Stem
Basis and entailment is based on the following result:
Theorem 4 Let L be a basis for the context M and
{A1, . . . , An} ∪ Y ⊆ A. The following conditions are
equivalent:
1) S ∪ {A1, . . . An} `p Y (`p is the entailment with the
production system).
2) S `A A1, . . . An → Y
3) M |= {A1, . . . An} → Y .
A. Association rules for a a formal context
We can consider a Stem Basis as an adequate knowledge
base for a production system in order to reason. However,
Stem Basis is designed for entailing true implications only,
without any exceptions in the object set nor implications
with a low number of counterexamples in the context.
Another more important question arises when it works
on predictions. In this case we are interested in obtaining
methods for selecting a result among all obtained results
(even if they are mutually incoherent). Theorem 4 does not
provide such a method. Therefore, it is better to consider as-
sociation rules (with confidence) instead of true implications.
Moreover, the initial production system must be revised for
working with confidence.
Investigations on sound logical reasoning methods with
association rules is a relatively recent research line with
promising applications [11]. In FCA, association rules are
implications among sets of attributes. Confidence and sup-
port are defined as usual. Recall that the support of X ,
Figure 2. Model for reasoning based on `∃
supp(X) of a set of attributes X is defined as the proportion
of objects which satisfy every attribute of X , and the
confidence of a association rule is conf(X → Y ) =
supp(X ∪ Y )/supp(X). Confidence can be interpreted as
an estimate of the probability P (Y |X), the probability of an
object satisfying every attribute of Y under the condition that
it also satisfies every one of X . Conexp software provides
association rules (and their confidence) for formal contexts.
III. FORMAL CONTEXTS AS KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES
Global memory is composed of events (objects) which
have a number of properties (attributes). They constitute a
global formal context M = (O,A, I) (which we call monster
context following the tradition in Model Theory) from which
subcontexts are extracted. Once the specific subcontext is
considered, it is also possible to consider background knowl-
edge ∆ which would be combined with the KB extracted
from formal context (Stem basis or association rules).
Definition. 5 Let M be a monster context, and let O ⊆ O.
1) A context on O is a context M = (O1, A, I) where
O ⊆ O1 ⊆ O, A ⊆ A and I ⊆ I.
2) A contextual selection on O and M is a map s : O →
P(O1)× P(A).
3) A contextual KB for an object o ∈ O w.r.t.
a selection s with confidence γ is a subset of
association rules with confidence greater or equal
to γ of the formal context associated to s(o) =
(s1(o), s2(o)), that is, to the context M(s(o)) :=
(s1(o), s2(o), Is1(o)×s2(o)) (note that when confi-
dence is 1 the contextual KB is a implicational basis).
The reasoning model on M is argumentative, where the
argument is based on KBs extracted from subcontexts.
Anagously to [12], the existential arguments are considered,
but replacing the consistent set by subcontext:
Definition. 6 Let L be an implication and ∆ a background
knowledge. It is said that L is a possible consequence of M
under the background knowledge ∆, M |=∆∃ L, if there exists
M a nonempty subcontext of M such that M |= ∆ ∪ {L}.
Note that by theorem 4, when ∆ is a set of implications,
it holds that |=∃ is equivalent to `∃ which is defined by:
M `∃ L if there exists M |= ∆ a subcontext of M such that
S `p L (where S is a SB for M ). In the example described
in Sect. 4, the reasoning model is based on `p on contextual
KBs for an object o ∈ O w.r.t. a selection given by an expert.
To compute all consequences by `∆∃ implies to consider the
entire model. However we only need consequences entailed
by a submodel. See section IV bellow.
Given Mi = (Oi, Ai, Ii), i = 1, 2 two subcontexts of M
the intersection of M1 and M2, M1 ∩M2 is
(O1∩O2, A1∪A2, I1∩((O1∩O2)×A1)∪I2∩((O1∩O2)×A2))
In order to study `∃ under background knowledge, it is
necessary to study the relationship among arguments based
on distinct contexts. Two compatibility notions can be used.
Definition. 7 Let Mi = (Oi, Ai, Ii), i = 1, 2 be two
subcontexts of M, and let ∆ be a background propositional
knowledge on the language of A1 ∩A2.
• It is said that M1 and M2 are compatible w.r.t ∆ if
there exists a supercontext M of M1 and M2 such that
M |= ∆.
• It is said that M1 and M2 are downward compatible
w.r.t ∆ if M1 ∩M2 |= ∆.
Compatible contexts are also downward compatible.
Therefore, it can jointly extend downward compatible con-
texts but they can not be restricted with logical reliability.
Thus, formal contexts can be extended in order to refine
results. It is also possible to work with any context whose
objects satisfy background knowledge ∆ to obtain `∃ con-
sequences.
Proposition. 8 If two contexts are compatible then they are
downward compatible
Proof: Suppose that M1 and M2 are compatible. Let M
be the supercontext for M1 and M2. By considering each
object o ∈M as a valuation vo on A defined by
vo(A) = 1⇐⇒ (o,A) ∈ I
the objects in M1∩M2 are models of ∆. Thus M1∩M2 |= ∆
The reciprocal is not true: Consider the context M =
(O,A, I) with O = {o1, o2, o3} and A = a1, a2, a3 and let
I = {(o1, a1), (o1, a3), (o2, a2), (o3, a1), (o3, a3)}. Let M1
be the subcontext with O1 = {o1, o2} and A1 = {a1, a2}
and let M2 be the subcontext with O2 = {o2, o3} and
A2 = a2, a3. The intersection M3 = M1 ∩ M2 has
O3 = {o2} and A3 = a1, a2, a3 and I3 = {(o2, a2)}.
Since M3 |= a2, we have that M1 and M2 are downward
compatible w.r.t. {a2} (seen as a propositional formula), yet
there is no supercontext of M1 and M2 satisfying a2.
The inference process for `∆∃ has tree steps (Fig. 2):
1) A question on whether a new event (object) has a
property (attribute) is raised. On the new object some
properties are known (attribute values) {A1, . . . An}.
Figure 3. Context based reasoning system
2) A contextual selection outputs a subcontext of M. A
contextual KB L (for some confidence threshold) is
computed for the subcontext. Selection made by a user
is composed by a small set of attributes.
3) The production system is executed on
L ∪ {A1, . . . An}. The results obtainedare the
attributes inferred about the event.
It has that, if A′ is inferred by the production system, then
M `∆∃ {A1, . . . An} → {A′}
Note that it does not compute all implications, only those
which are entailed from the attributes selected by the user.
A. Incompatible attributes
Implication logics do not suffer from inconsistency issues.
However, in FCA it can be usual to consider incompatible
attributes. A pair A1, A2 of incompatible attributes verifies
that M |= ¬(A1 ∧ A2). If such a formula is included in
background knowledge ∆ it is possible to deal with incon-
sistency issues, because `∃ is an argumentative entailment
which works on subcontexts (see def. of `∃ in [12]).
Two options have been considered for solving this prob-
lem by FCA. The first one is based on avoiding inconsisten-
cies using conservative retraction [13]. The aim is to remove
one attribute from incompatible pairs in contextual KB, next
to present related attribute proof. We have selected a second
option: to use association rules and do not consider any
background knowledge. In this way, inferred attribute with
maximum confidence is selected [8].
IV. EXAMPLE: DATA ON SOCCER LEAGUE MATCHES
We have applied the model for soccer betting. The project
starts with the hypothesis that past data hides trends of
soccer teams that experts use for forecasting. The monster
model is composed of data (past and current) on matches
(the objects, with temporal stamp). The experiment carries
out seven stages (see Fig. 3):
1) Selection of the set of relevant attributes to consider.
It is made by the user.
2) Data extraction. With this data the system is capable
of building any subcontext needed. In the data time
stamps are important, because a number of attributes
deal with past matches. Data has been extracted from
the RSSSF Archive (http://www.rsssf.com) from the
past ten years. Objects are matches (with temporal
stamp), and attributes are computed for each object.
The relevant properties (attributes) that experts se-
lected was 17, several of them are parametrized (for
example, ranking difference above a threshold). An
attribute with threshold can produce a large number of
binary attributes by changing the threshold. Thus the
explicit computation of M is not feasible. It has three
distinguished attributes, corresponding of Team1 wins
(1), Team2 wins (2) and draws (X).
3) Selection of a (future) match.
4) Contextual selection, based on the selection of thresh-
olds for attributes.
5) Computing of attribute values for the match from
data (to build the subcontext), except obviously the
value of distinguished attributes.
6) Execution of the System (association rules as KB and
attributes for the object as facts). Several modes for
confidence computing, based on uncertain reasoning
techniques by Expert Systems are considered [8].
7) Result: a triple < (1, c1), (X, cx), (2, c2) > of pairs
(attribute, confidence), for the selected match.
V. EXPERIMENTS
Two experiments were launched for Spanish soccer
league, on 2009-10 and 2010-11 seasons. Attributes were
selected according to authors’ knowledge about Spanish
soccer league (which are not experts). From this contextual
selection, `∃ was computed for all matches and weeks.
2009-10 season: Experiments with the system show fore-
casts of about 58.16% by a contextual selection based
on the previous 38 matches. Such a percentage of hits
for a qualitative reasoning system may be considered as
an acceptable result comparable with expectable results of
experts [14]. Experiments also shows an increase in the
number of hits by about 7% in the second half of the season.
The reason is that data from the first half provides more
recent information on teams and past matches.
2010-11 season: A way to evaluate how good is this
forecasting sistem is comparing number of successes in our
pool with the most popular betting selections. This popular
selections are collected from the most voted results for each
match, published at state agency web that controls soccer
pools. In Fig. 4 both results are compared. Our hits are in
blue and popular ones in green and last seventeen weeks
from 2010-11 season are represented. Note that Spanish
soccer pools are over 15 matches.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
The model presented is concerned with association rule
reasoning and it does not use -in its current form- more
sophisticated probability tools (se e.g. [15]). As is stated
in [16], the theory of probabilistic mental models assumes
Figure 4. Correct predictions on the last 17 weeks of the season 2010-11 compared with popular the most popular bets
that inferences about unknown states of the world are based
on probability cues [17]. In some sense, association rules’s
confidence plays the role of probability cues in the model.
The relationship of our proposal with RH [2] (roughly
speaking, if one of the possibilities is recognized and the
other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the
higher value with respect to the criterion) is not clear. We
may assert that our model recognises trends in contexts.
Trends (represented as association rules or implication basis)
can be considered as a kind of recognizing method, though.
It is worth noting that it only uses `∃ because the aim is to
simulate bounded reasoning. Other entailment relationships
from argumentative framework, as for example `∀, have
not been considered in this paper, because it requires of an
exhaustive exploration of M.
Part of our ongoing work includes two research lines. The
first one is the analysis of conservative retraction method
for working with incompatible attributes. The second one
is to simulate the attribute learning process in our model,
applying non monotone reasoning techniques.
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